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Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 





European countries are experiencing population decline, and the tacit assumption in 
most analyses is that this decline may have detrimental effects on welfare. In this paper, 
we use a survey conducted in the Netherlands to find out whether population decline is 
always met with fear. A number of results stand out. Population size preferences differ 
by geographic proximity, as the majority of respondents favor a decline in the global 
population, but support a stationary population closer to home. Population decline is 
clearly not always met with fear: 31% of respondents would like the population to 
decline at the national level, and they generally perceive decline to be accompanied by 
non-material welfare gains (improved environment), as well as material welfare losses 
(tax increases, economic stagnation). In addition to these driving forces, it appears that 
attitudes toward immigrants are very strong determinants of views regarding population 
growth at the local and the national levels. Immigrants seem to inspire greater fear than 
the prospect of population decline. 
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1. Introduction 
The threat of population decline is not unique in demographic history, and has always 
been accompanied by stories of doom and gloom. During the first half of the 20th 
century, the decline in fertility and the quality of children were matters of public debate 
in many Western European countries (cf. Wicksell 1914; Keynes 1937). Current trends 
in fertility and mortality indicate that all developed countries have to reckon with the 
possibility of population decline, although the United States and New Zealand seem to 
be the exceptions to the rule. In all countries witnessing population decline, concerns 
have also been voiced about the loss of national identity because of lowered fertility and 
increased immigration (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998). France offers perhaps the 
clearest example within Europe of this attitude: former president Giscard d’Estaing 
stated his opposition to abortion, and said in a speech that “a society no longer capable 
of assuring the replacement of generations is a condemned society” (cited in Teitelbaum 
and Winter 1985:122). 
A striking element in the debate about population decline is that it is dominated by 
concerned politicians, local government officials, academics, and journalists who are 
always on the lookout for “a good doom story.”
3 For example, Newsweek published an 
article on the “Birth Dearth” in 2004, in which it claimed that the “new threat to the 
planet is not too many people but too few” (Newsweek, September 27, 2004). The 
citizens who have to live in regions or towns threatened by population decline are 
conspicuously absent in this debate. This is an unfortunate omission, because the 
quality of living arrangements is an important determinant of local voting behavior. 
Citizens can vote by casting a ballot in elections, or, if they lose their faith in 
government, they may vote with their feet by migrating to regions or countries where 
life still seems good (van Dalen and Henkens 2007). Under such circumstances, 
migration can reinforce population decline developments. 
In this article, we examine the population size preferences of the Dutch population 
and its main determinants. The research question is threefold. First, what are the 
population size preferences of Dutch citizens concerning the population level of their 
place of residence and at the country level? Second, how can these preferences be 
explained? And third, how strong is the support for population-increasing policies? 
A perspective on the Netherlands is interesting for a number of reasons. 
Demographic projections of Statistics Netherlands show that, in 2025, more than one-
half of Dutch municipalities will experience population decline. This development has 
provoked great concern among local governments, and makes for alarmist messages in 
 
3 Stark and Kohler (2002) have also pointed out how the popular press has a tendency to stress the negative 
consequences of low fertility, despite the fact that “many of the causes of low fertility are associated with 
social and economic progress” (p. 535). Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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national newspapers. The following are some examples of the types of messages that 
are appearing in the media: “Shrinking towns should not become ghettos for senior 
citizens,” “Cities are ill-prepared for population decline,” and “The better educated are 
having too few children.” In short, population decline is slowly but gradually becoming 
part of the Dutch reality, and in some regions it is already a fact of life (see Haartsen 
and Venhorst 2010). 
Second, the Netherlands is one of the most crowded and urbanized nations in the 
planet. This high population density would seem to make the Dutch sensitive to issues 
of population size and structure. In fact, the feeling that the country is “overpopulated” 
has been among the main drivers of emigration of Dutch natives in recent years (van 
Dalen and Henkens 2007). 
One of the elements of the debate on population decline is that the geographical 
perspective is either unclear, or it is not consistently applied by citizens and politicians 
(cf. Teitelbaum and Winter (1985), who also point out this issue). Discussions 
sometimes focus on the global level, with commentators suggesting that the growth in 
the world’s population exceeds the carrying capacity of the earth. Other debates center 
on individual countries, regions, or cities. In addition letting the people speak, and not 
the authorities, in this paper we seek to disentangle the population size preferences of 
the Dutch for different geographical perspectives that seem to play a role in population 
debates. We will study the differences in attitudes toward population decrease or 
increase at the levels of the place of residence, the country, and the world. To capture 
population preferences and underlying attitudes toward population growth, we 
developed a survey that was carried out in 2009 among the Dutch population. In the 
survey, population size preferences, as well as the expected consequences of population 
decline, were measured at different regional levels. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will elaborate on the 
Dutch context. In Section 3 we look at the theories that shed light on the consequences 
of population decline, and we formulate our main hypotheses regarding population size 
preferences. Section 4 presents the data and methods used to test the hypotheses. We 
continue in Section 5 with a presentation of the results of multivariate analyses that 
examined the question of why some people support, and others oppose declining 
populations. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the main findings and a discussion. 
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2. Population decline: Stylized facts and forecasts 
In this paper, we will focus on the Dutch case, which embodies a number of 
demographic characteristics that are shared by numerous Western European countries. 
But the Netherlands also represents a case that incorporates unique elements that are 
often left out of population analyses. 
We will start by describing the demographic elements that the Netherlands has in 
common with other European countries. Based on Eurostat forecasts, Figure 1 presents 
the population changes that are expected to occur in European regions. The population 
in the entire region (EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland) is expected to grow from 508 
million in 2008 to 534 million in 2030. Because of fewer births (due to below-
replacement fertility and smaller cohorts of women reaching reproductive age) and 
more deaths (due to population aging), the number of regions with more deaths than 
births is expected to rise from 131 in 2008 to 207 in 2030. However, for some regions 
the natural decrease is compensated by migration flows; hence, reductions in population 
numbers are predicted for almost 100 regions. Most of these regions can be found in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. 
Spain, Greece, and Italy also have several regions with projected population declines. A 
decrease of more than 20% is anticipated for Severozapaden (Bulgaria) and the German 
regions of Chemnitz, Saxony-Anhalt, Dresden, and Thuringia. Such a large drop is not 
foreseen for the Netherlands in this period, as the onset of the decline in the country 
lags considerably behind the beginnings of the downward trends in these regions. The 
Dutch demographic future is, however, characterized by falling population numbers: 
recent population forecasts suggest that, at the aggregate level, the Dutch population 
will slowly begin to decrease at a national level around 2040 (Van Duin and Garssen 
2011). 
Behind the aggregate demographic statistics emerges the picture of a divide 
between the populous Dutch west (“Randstad”), which will in all likelihood experience 
some further increases in population size and density, and the remaining, more rural 
regions that will experience—and are already strongly experiencing—population 
declines. Figure 2 clearly illustrates how the Netherlands is a mixture of regions with 
population growth and population decreases (De Jong and Garssen 2009). 
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Figure 2:  Population change (in growth rates) at the municipality level between 
2007 and 2025, The Netherlands 
 
Source: CBS Statline. 
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For these reasons, the Dutch government is slowly but steadily changing its course 
from not interfering in matters of population, to taking a coordinating role in balancing 
the pressures of population growth in urban regions against the prospect of population 
decline in rural regions. In short, the Netherlands provides us with a case study in how 
the state deals with opposing demographic forces—a challenge that is likely to arise 
throughout the European Union, which is marked by depressed regions facing 
depopulation, and prosperous regions that are still experiencing growth. In addition to 
its population growth diversity, the Netherlands is similar to the rest of Europe in other 
respects as well. For example, total fertility rates in the country are below replacement 
level (1.7), although this level does not yet concern most government officials.
4 Active 
government involvement in matters of fertility is absent, although members of 
parliament are constantly pleading for a policy to make it easier for people to combine 
work and family. Employers are concerned about the labor market consequences of 
population decline, but when it comes to counteracting this development, the large 
majority of Dutch employers do not support pronatalistic policies, and mainly seek 
economic solutions (see van Dalen et al. 2010). 
Immigration is also a hotly debated issue in the Netherlands, as the percentage of 
foreigners who live in the country is substantial by European standards (13% of the 
total population), and immigrants of non-Western origin are met with particular 
skepticism or even outright hostility. The weak integration of non-Western immigrants 
is generally seen as a failure, and the general attitude of the government toward 
immigration is one of restraining inflow. 
 In addition to these common elements, the Dutch case may be of considerable 
interest as it has some unique features that are not yet present in other countries. At the 
time of the survey, the Netherlands was, with 484 citizens per square kilometer, one of 
the most crowded countries of the EU,
5 followed by Belgium (351 people per km
2) and 
the UK (251 per km
2). If we do not consider the world’s island states and city states, we 
could even say that it is one of the most crowded countries in the world—only South 
Korea is more densely populated, with 492 citizens per km
2. The Dutch may therefore 
see not only the negative sides of population decline but also the positive consequences. 
As in other countries, the Netherlands has a pressure group that favors population 
decline: the “Club of Ten Million” advocates a population decrease, as long as the 
Dutch population remains larger than what it considers the optimal number of 10 
 
4 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as illustrated by a recent event. The Christian minister André 
Rouvoet aired the opinion in the Dutch newspaper De Pers (February 18, 2008) that it would be good idea to 
have a discussion about population policy in light of the rising costs of aging. His ideal fertility level for 
coping with the consequences of aging would be 2.1. Even though he stated that he was not in favor of a 
pronatalistic population policy, his suggestion sparked off a lively debate in which most politicians expressed 
their disgust about this “faux pas” of a cabinet member. 
5 If Malta is not taken into account, then it is the most densely populated country of the EU. van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
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million inhabitants (it currently is 16.5 million inhabitants). Population density matters 
for Dutch government policy because access to public services and public goods are 
hampered by congestion effects, with traffic congestion being the most obvious 
problem. But congestion is also challenge in questions of health care, public transport, 
parking, schooling, social housing, and the use of public forests, or in issues concerning 
the environment in general. Indeed, the Netherlands has a long history of concern about 
the consequences of overpopulation. This was one of the big policy issues that was 
debated by Dutch citizens and politicians in the years following the Second World War. 
It even led some politicians in the 1950s—notably, Prime Minister Drees—to urge the 
Dutch to leave their country (van Dalen and Henkens 2007). Overpopulation was then 
seen as one of the driving forces behind long-term unemployment and housing 
shortages. Over time, the Dutch appear to have learned to cope with the consequences 
of a densely populated country, as the promotion of emigration has faded away. 
However, the level of (spatial) regulation has become of paramount importance in the 
Netherlands, as virtually every individual action is accompanied by external effects. 
The government seeks to address the consequences of a high population density by 
means of rules and regulations, and, wherever possible, through the use of price 




3. Population decline and theory 
Economic and demographic theory do not offer an unambiguous prediction regarding 
the consequences of population decline. The debate among scholars is marked by 
optimists and pessimists regarding the prospect of population decline. We will not 
review the entire literature and history surrounding the issue of decline (see Coleman 
and Rowthorn (2011) for a more detailed discussion of that point, and Teitelbaum and 
Winter 1985, 1998), but we will briefly highlight the main theoretical strands, and use 
these insights as a guide to understanding how people make their assessments. 
 
 
3.1 Negative consequences of decline 
The ways in which population declines can have negative consequences can be reduced 
to three important transmission mechanisms.  
The first mechanism refers to the connection between public finance and 
population size, at both the local and national levels. The prospect of population decline 
can be of considerable importance for an extensive welfare state, as pensions and social Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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security are usually financed on a pay-as-you-go basis; such a method works well in the 
face of an expanding population, but the financial basis may become unsustainable 
when the decline is rapid and prolonged.
6 For example, pure public goods and services 
can be more easily financed when the relevant population is growing. The logic behind 
this public sector calculus is fairly straightforward: the average tax burden for the 
provision for a public good can be spread over more people. National defense or a dyke 
are examples pure public goods: i.e., goods for which it is neither feasible nor desirable 
to ration their use (Stiglitz 2000). Once the decision has been made to build a dyke and 
a certain threshold has been surpassed, the financing of the public good is easier when 
the tax base covers 200,000 instead of 100,000 citizens. A decline in the population 
may therefore be accompanied by negative consequences because (1) the tax base 
decreases, but if government expenditures are fixed or slow to adjust, deficits 
accumulate, and tax rates will eventually have to rise; and (2) if certain population 
levels are needed to finance public goods (e.g., schools, hospitals, public transport) that 
are essential for a community to function, and the population drops below these 
thresholds, the process of depopulation may speed up. Both of these elements are 
relevant for understanding the consequences for public finances of a shift from a 
growing to a declining population. If a population is growing based on an upswing in 
fertility, the population will be relatively young, and a country or region will benefit 
from the fact that a young population generates more net benefits than an aging 
population. Geys, Heinemann, and Kalb (2008) show for a sample of 1,021 German 
municipalities how smaller municipalities (fewer than 6,000 inhabitants) in particular 
are vulnerable to increasing cost pressures resulting from population declines.   
Of course, a nation or region experiencing a population decline need not 
experience in increase in tax rates if the relevant government adapts to changing 
circumstances, and brings the level of public expenditures in line with the tax base. The 
problems start mounting when communities or cities do not adapt, clinging to the old 
level of expenditures, even as tax income drops along with the decline in population, 
and these shortfalls can only be countered by raising tax rates. In other cases local 
governments may refuse to face up to a probable future of decline and start a “race to 
the bottom” by trying to attract people from other regions or countries. Some Dutch 
cities (notably in the regions experiencing population decline) have tried the strategy of 
offering lower tax rates or higher service levels, but in general most come to realize that 
this is a zero-sum game: alleviating the problems of one city exacerbates the problems 
of a neighboring one. 
 
6 To illustrate the size of the compensating demographic measures that might be required, Bongaarts (2004) 
has shown that a 10% reduction in public pension expenditures might obviously be established by cutting 
benefits by 10%. However, the same objective might be achieved by raising the total fertility rate 
(permanently) by 0.3, or by increasing (again permanently) the immigration rate by 1.8 immigrants per 1,000 
inhabitants. van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
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A second mechanism by which population size affects the economy is when the 
population size or density influences the relative price of a good or service or factor 
supplies (capital, labor, land). A source of particular concern to most citizens in 
developed countries is the price of housing. If a population decline leads to a decrease 
in housing demand, and the housing supply remains fixed, then falling prices may be 
the result. This relationship may be perceived as a decline in welfare, as housing wealth 
makes up a large proportion of the total wealth of households (if they own a home). In 
short, the consequences of a population decline for home owners depend in large part 
how the housing market functions, as the supply of housing reacts only very slowly to 
changes in demand, whereas demand is closely tied to the age structure of a population 
(Mankiw and Weil 1989). A baby boom can therefore lead to a strong rise in housing 
prices with a considerable time lag, as potential (first-time) home buyers are usually in 
the 25-40 age range. The opposite can also occur when the boom is followed by a bust, 
although the reaction may be asymmetric, as the housing supply will adapt only very 
slowly to the decline in demand. Property owners are not apt to demolish their house 
and decrease the surplus of housing, as Eichholtz  and Lindenthal (2007) suggest. It is 
more likely that a population decline will reveal itself in the proliferation of vacant 
dwellings, lower housing prices, and a limited transaction volume of houses bought and 
sold. Of course, whether a person perceives the consequences of population decline for 
the housing market to be negative depends on whether he or she owns a house. It may 
very well be the case that young people who have yet to enter the housing market may 
see the advent of population decline as a blessing. Like in other European countries, the 
Dutch housing market is unbalanced, with real estate prices that skyrocketed during the 
1990s, when younger generations in the Netherlands financed their (first) home 
purchases entirely through mortgages, rather than through private savings.  
A third mechanism that is often stressed in economic theory is the link between 
economies of scale, population size or density, and technical progress. The power of 
cities is that they internalize the externalities that are tied to a number of markets 
essential for the progress of cities. Many noted authors have made this link, including 
Marshall (1920), Jacobs (1969), Lucas (1988), Krugman (1991, 1998), and Glaeser 
(1998). Population growth may serve as a stimulant for technical progress and 
entrepreneurial activity. The fear of city councils of a decline in the local population is 
therefore understandable. Outmigration flows may signal to potential entrepreneurs and 
citizens that a specific urban agglomeration is sliding into a phase of economic 
stagnation or decline.  
Based on the different mechanisms that point to the negative consequences of 
population decline for the wealth of nations or cities, we formulate the materialism 
hypothesis: People who expect a reduction in population numbers to have adverse Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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material consequences (e.g., an increase in taxes or a decrease in the provision of public 
goods) are less likely to prefer a decline in population.  
 
 
3.2 Positive consequences of decline 
Other theories point to the adverse consequences of overpopulation, and therefore assert 
that population decline may have a benign effect on economic welfare. There are two 
related strands of literature that argue for the benefits of declining population. Some 
proponents of this view have suggested that certain public goods are not as positive as 
the economic textbooks would suggest, and give rise to congestion in use. Infrastructure 
like highways or electrical power networks can be overutilized during rush hours, as an 
increase in the number of inhabitants leads to congestion. The link with population 
growth is not, however, cast in stone, because it presumes that every new or existing 
member of the population exhibits the same type of behavior. 
A discussion of negative externalities can also be found in the literature, with some 
authors stressing that the growth in the world’s population exceeds the carrying 
capacity of the earth. This mechanism relates to the Malthusian assertion that the earth’s 
capacity to support mankind is outpaced by population growth. The main proponent of 
this view was Hardin (1968), who explained this idea more fully in his classic article, 
“Tragedy of the Commons.”
7 The logic of his argument relies on the presence of an 
impure public good: i.e., the commons. When it is impossible to limit use of this good, 
through either market forces or central planning, the commons will become 
overcrowded. This is what seems to be happening to the environment, and it is the 
central thesis behind Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth. Hardin related the 
tragedy directly to the problem of overpopulation, and his conclusion was therefore 
quite unequivocal: “Freedom to breed will bring ruin to us all” (1968:1248). The 
finiteness of natural resources and the presence of “the commons” in various domains 
of life may lead citizens to view population growth as exhibiting negative externalities. 
There are numerous political pressure groups in the international arena
8 trying to 
establish zero or negative population growth in order to prevent a “tragedy of the 
commons.”  
Following this line of reasoning, we state the non-materialism hypothesis: People 
who expect population decline to improve the non-material living circumstances (better 
 
7 Hardin was not the first to examine the classic problem of the commons. For an overview of scholars who 
examined the commons problem, see Stavins (2011). 
8 See, for example, the program of the association Negative Population Growth (http://www.npg.org/), or the 
Dutch Club of Ten Million (http://www.tienmiljoen.nl/Eng/index.htm). van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
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environmental quality, less population pressure, less noise pollution) are more likely to 




3.3 The tension between immigration and population decline 
A third issue that needs to be addressed refers to the composition of population growth 
or decline. Attitudes of citizens may differ according to the composition of population 
growth. People may be concerned about population decline, but may reject the 
opportunities that international migration provides for counteracting further decreases 
in the population. It is at this point that politics and demography intersect. Indeed, 
Teitelbaum and Winter (1998) have stressed the importance of studying the interaction 
between declining fertility, international migration, and national identity in developed 
countries jointly, and on a national basis. The prime reason for this national focus can 
be traced back to the experience that the nexus between fertility, migration, and identity 
“always reflects local histories, attitudes and interests.” (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998:4) 
Immigration in particular evokes mixed emotions among politicians and the population 
at large. On the one hand, international migration offers employers access to a pool of 
labor supply that may mitigate labor market frictions. Under quite general assumptions, 
immigration also offers host countries a net welfare gain (Borjas 1995). On the other 
hand, most European countries have a hard time adapting to the status of being nations 
of immigrants, as the assimilation or integration of non-Western immigrants has not 
gone as smoothly and quickly as initially anticipated. Ethnic identities appear to be 
more persistent than was expected, and, as Bisin et al. (2011) have shown, immigrants 
with a strong ethnic identity (i.e., attachment to religion, cultural traditions, and 
language) do not fare well in European labor markets. Furthermore, distribution of the 
net welfare gain of immigration tends to be unevenly spread among the native 
population. Many studies have noted that the negative effects are concentrated in 
certain parts of the native population, such as the less educated (see van Dalen and 
Henkens 2005). 
The rapid rise of political anti-immigration movements is a response to frustration 
and fear in a number of European countries: Austria (Freedom Party), France (National 
Front), Belgium (Vlaams Blok), Denmark (Danish People’s Party), and Italy (Northern 
League). The Netherlands is no exception to this trend either, as the Dutch have 
witnessed the rise of a similar party (PVV or the Freedom Party), and party leader, 
Geert Wilders, whose political program is rather outspoken and negative about the 
 
9 We acknowledge that some of these non-material effects can have material effects (e.g., traffic jams can 
affect the number of hours worked, and less noise pollution leads to higher housing prices), but for the 
purposes of this paper, we focus on direct effects. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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admission of non-Western, Muslim migrants. Although members of this political party 
are quite articulate in expressing their opposition to expanded international migration, 
the support of immigration restrictions in the Netherlands is broad-based, including by 
parties in the center of the political spectrum and liberal parties. We predict that people 
who view the integration of immigrants negatively are more likely to prefer a decrease 




4. Data and method 
To examine the population size and policy preferences of Dutch citizens and their 
perceptions about the consequences of population decline, we developed a 
questionnaire that was distributed among a representative sample of Dutch citizens. The 
survey was carried out in January 2009 by the institute CentER Data of Tilburg 
University. CentER Data maintains a nationwide panel of households in the 
Netherlands. The panel is representative of the Dutch population with respect to sex, 
age, education, religion, and regional variation. Respondents are interviewed mainly 
online, and for those who do not have access to the Internet, data are collected through a 
television Netbox system.
10 As such, there is no selectivity with regard to whether 
people have Internet access or not. In general, people participate in the panel for about 
four years, and they are regularly interviewed on several topics over the course of this 
period. When a respondent leaves the panel, a new respondent is selected on the basis 
of socio-demographic characteristics, so that representativeness will be maintained. 
Respondents are on average 51.3 years old and 46% female. Approximately 11% of the 
respondents live in one of the provinces (Limburg and Zeeland) that have experienced 
population decline in the period 2000-2009 (see Table 1).  
 
 
10 Participants who do not have Internet access are provided with a special service by the institute 
CentERdata, which allows them to access the Internet through their televisions. Households that do not have a 
TV set are given one by CentERdata. For more information on the panel data, see http://www.centerdata.nl/ 
en/. van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
Variables   Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Population preference, local  2.05  0.52  1  3 
Population preference, national  2.25  0.55  1  3 
Population preference, global  2.49  0.55  1  3 
Age (in years)  51.3  16.0  16  93 
Sex (0=male, 1=female)  0.46  0.50  0  1 
Educational level (1=low level to 6=high level)  3.64  1.52  1  6 
Income adequacy (1= with great difficulty to 4=very easy)  2.88  0.70  1  4 
Role of religion in life (1=very important to 4=not important at all) 3.05  0.97  1  4 
Local population density (1=very high to 5=very low)  2.96  1.31  1  5 
Province of population decline during 2000-2009 (0= no)  0.11  0.32  0  1 
Expected consequences of population decline with respect to:       
Local tax level  3.50  0.67  1  5 
Local public service level
a 2.66  0.50  1  5 
Space and nature, local level  3.43  0.62  1  5 
National tax level  3.50  0.70  1  5 
National economic growth potential
a 2.99  0.54  1  5 
Space and nature, national level  3.52  0.68  1  5 
Attitudes toward immigration
a  2.81 0.79  1  5 
Attitudes toward global warming
a 3.24  0.68  1  5 
 
Sample N = 2035. 
(a): see Appendix for description of scale variables. 
 
The population size preferences of the respondents are surveyed at three levels of 
aggregation: the population of the level of the local community, the population at the 
national level, and the population at the global level. People were asked to answer the 
following question: “Do you think that the number of [inhabitants in your place of 
residence] should increase, stay the same, or decrease?”
11 
To examine the variations in local and national population size preferences, we 
focus on the expected consequences of population decline at the corresponding local 
and national levels. We do not explain global preferences, as we presume this exercise 
is too difficult for citizens to grasp. Respondents are more likely to have more or less 
informed expectations and information on national and local circumstances. To evaluate 
the material consequences of population decline at the level of the place of residence, 
we introduce a variable measuring the expectations of people with respect to the local 
tax level. And to measure the expected material effects of population decline on the 
provision of public goods, we introduce a (scale) variable to capture the perception of 
public amenities (e.g., the number of shops and the level of services). A similar 
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procedure is used to measure the public benefits of population decline at the national 
level, but this time the scale variable comprises the expected effects of population 
decline on economic growth and the level of innovation. The non-material 
consequences of population decline are represented by a variable measuring the 
expected consequences of the decline for open space and nature. The quality of the 
national environment is summarized by a question about the expected levels of open 
space and nature for the nation as a whole. Finally, we present two scale variables that 
relate to both global and national issues: attitudes regarding immigration and global 
warming. The complete list of scale variables and the underlying items are presented in 
the appendix to this paper, A1. Descriptive statistics for each of the different variables 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
5. Explaining population size preferences 
The first issue we would like to address is whether people favor a larger or a smaller 
population size. The overall answer is that population size preferences differ markedly 
depending on the geographical perspective of the respondents. 
The majority of the Dutch are in favor of global population decline. We also asked 
respondents how large this preferred decline should be. The question posed was: “The 
current global population consists of 6.7 billion inhabitants. What is, in your opinion, a 
desirable population size?” The most common answer was five billion people, with the 
average preferred population number being 5.6 billion. In 2008, the world population 
was estimated to be 6.8 billion; hence, according to the Dutch, the global population 
should decrease by 1.2 billion persons. 
The size of the group preferring a population decline decreases as the geographic 
focus moves closer to home: 31% of respondents said they want the population of the 
Netherlands to be smaller, but when the same question was asked about their local place 
of residence, only 16% said they are in favor of a decline in population. Most of the 
respondents said they prefer the status quo for their country and/or their place of 
residence. However, if researchers were to ask for a numeric evaluation of the desired 
population size, the Dutch would generally opt for a small population decline. The 
average desired population size is 15 million inhabitants, which is 1.5 million less than 
the current 16.5 million. 
 van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
Figure 3:  Preferred population sizes at the global, national, and local  
















































Source: NIDI survey on population decline (2009). 
 
We tested the three hypotheses mentioned in the previous section using 
multinomial logit analysis. In doing so, we compared the supporters of either 
population decline or increase with those citizens who favor the status quo. We tested 
the hypotheses at two different levels. First, we examined the driving forces behind 
population size preferences at the national level, and then performed a comparable 
analysis at the local level (place of residence).  
 
Population size preferences at the national level 
Table 2 presents the multinomial logit analysis explaining population size preferences 
at the national level. The first column shows that supporters of a population decline are 
less pessimistic about its negative economic consequences, and are much more negative 
about the inflow and integration of immigrants than proponents of the status quo. 
Moreover, supporters of a population decline expect positive externalities from such a 
decline: in particular, environmental quality is expected to improve considerably. This 
conclusion holds for the perceived increase in open space and nature at the national 
level, but these supporters also perceive population decline as a force that can counter 
concerns about global warming. The non-materialism hypothesis is therefore an 
important force in explaining preferences for population decline at the national level.  
The second column shows that the materialism hypothesis and the population 
composition hypothesis are supported when it comes to explaining preferences for a 
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population increase. Proponents of a population increase can be found among those 
respondents who expect a decrease in population to have negative economic 
consequences (especially in terms of tax levels), and those who perceive net benefits 
from international migration. Interestingly, the non-materialism hypothesis is not 
supported in terms of preferences for population increase.  
Close inspection of the groups supporting a decrease in the population reveals an 
odd political feature, as the supporters of a population decline are found at the extremes 
of the political spectrum. On the one hand, proponents of lower population numbers can 
be found among those who oppose international migration, and such supporters can be 
found mainly among right-wing voters. On the other hand, we find proponents of 
population decline among people who are concerned about the global environment and 
the preservation of open space and nature at the national level, and they can usually be 
found among left-wing voters. In short, population decline makes for strange 
bedfellows. 
 
Table 2:  Multinomial logit analysis explaining population size preferences of 
Dutch citizens at the country level (N=2,035),  
status quo = base outcome 
  Population size preference  
with respect to national population 
Explanatory variables  Decline  Increase 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Perceived consequences of population 
decline on: 
       
 National tax level  -0.47**  6.16    0.72**  4.33 
 National economic growth potential  0.34**  3.32    -0.16  0.89 
 National space and nature  0.50**  5.90    -0.07  0.46 
Attitudes toward:         
 Immigration  -0.65**  8.84    0.27*  2.01 
 Global warming  0.27**  3.47    -0.18  1.32 
Background variables         
 Age  0.00  1.28    0.00  0.52 
 Sex (male = 0)  -0.08  0.72    -0.68**  3.27 
 Years of education  0.04  1.18    -0.06  0.91 
 Income adequacy  0.05  0.61    -0.33*  2.32 
 Religiosity level  0.15**  2.70    0.09  0.91 
 Population density, place of residence -0.07  1.68    -0.16*  2.04 
 Province of decline (no = 0)  -0.62**  3.29    -0.20  0.65 
Constant -1.99**  2.81    -2.21  1.65 
Pseudo R
2     0.10 
 
Note: Absolute t values are stated in parentheses. * Significant at p <0.05. ** Significant at p <0.01. van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
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In Table 3 we present more descriptive statistics about the perceived consequences 
of population decline at the national level for three categories of respondents: 
supporters of a population increase, advocates of a stationary population, and supporters 
of a decline in population. The first column of this table shows that, on aggregate, the 
majority of respondents expect that a population decline would have negative economic 
consequences, as well as positive effects on the environment. The groups differ in the 
weight they assign to externalities. Whereas supporters of a population decline 
emphasize the positive externalities with respect to improvements in space and nature, 
40% of them also expect—and apparently accept—the negative implications with 
respect to tax levels. Of those who support a population increase, the majority (79%) 
expect tax increases as a result of a possible population decline. However, it is 
interesting to note that supporters of a population increase also seem to recognize the 
possible negative externalities of population growth with respect to the environment. 
Almost half (45%) of respondents are aware that population decline will probably have 
beneficial effects on the quality of the natural environment, and will lead to increases in 
the amount of open space. 
 
Table 3:  Percentage in agreement with expected consequences of population 
decline at the national level, grouped by population size preference 
   Proponents  of: 
Expected consequences of decline:  Total  Increase  Stationarity  Decline 
Increase in tax level  55  79  60  40 
Increase in nature and space  56  45  50  71 
Decrease in traffic congestion  55  29  49  72 
Decrease in unemployment  51  38  47  61 
Decrease in economic growth  26  39  28  19 
Decrease in innovation potential  13  29  14  9 
N =   2039  120  1288  632 
 
Source: NIDI survey on population decline (2009). 
 
Population size preferences at the local level 
Table 4 presents the results of the corresponding analysis of population size preferences 
at the level of place of residence. To a large extent, this analysis provides a similar 
picture to that found at the national level, with significant support for the population 
composition hypothesis and the non-materialism hypothesis. Those who favor local 
population decline have strong anti-immigration sentiments. The individual survey 
items suggest that fear of the “foreign” element is clearly present among the Dutch: 
approximately 52% of respondents agree with the statement: “The growth in the Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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number of foreigners contributes to crime and terrorism.”
12 Supporters of population 
decline are also much more worried about the impact of population density on the 
environmental quality of their place of residence. With respect to preferences regarding 
population growth, the results provide support for the materialism hypothesis. In 
addition the positive effects of an increase in the population at the level of local taxes, it 
is clear that concerns about the level of local public services are also an important factor 
in explaining a preference for population growth. Citizens in favor of population growth 
at the local level are particularly worried about the possible negative externalities of 
population decline on the level of public amenities (e.g. schools, swimming pools) and 
the number of local shops. This factor does not seem to play a role in explaining 
preferences for population decline. 
 
Table 4:  Multinomial logit analysis explaining population size preferences 
with respect to place of residence (N=2035),  
status quo = base outcome 
  Population size preference  
with respect to local population 
Explanatory variables  Decreasing population Increasing population 
 Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Perceived consequences of population 
decline on: 
    
 Local tax level  -0.30** 3.19 0.30** 2.57 
 Local public service level  0.08  0.57  -0.50**  3.44 
 Local space and nature  0.39**  3.65  -0.23*  1.90 
Attitudes toward:      
 Immigration  -0.63**  7.18  0.28**  2.78 
 Global warming  0.36**  3.91  -0.28**  2.67 
Background variables      
 Age  0.00  0.68  0.00  0.81 
 Sex (male = 0)  0.03  0.26  -0.58**  3.74 
 Years of education  0.04  0.85  -0.01  0.24 
 Income adequacy  -0.01  0.13  -0.06  0.56 
 Religiosity  0.22**  3.06  0.00  0.03 
 Population density, place of residence -0.34**  6.47  0.12*  2.00 
 Province of decline (no = 0)  -0.35  1.41  0.36  1.77 
Constant -2.08**  2.23  0.02  0.02 
Pseudo R
2   0.08 
 
Note: Absolute t values are stated in parentheses. * Significant at p <0.05. ** Significant at p <0.01. 
 
                                                           
12 The question of the extent to which these anti-immigration opinions are associated with actual individual 
experiences of crime, or with other factors, such as stereotypes, is beyond the scope of this paper. van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  456
Background factors 
Thus far we have not discussed the role of background variables in the explanation of 
population size preferences. At this stage of the paper, however, it may be interesting to 
consider these variables. If we compare the models across the different geographical 
levels, a number of observations can be made about the background factors in the 
various models. First, women are less in favor of population increases at the local and 
national levels than men. Second, among the supporters of population decline at the 
local and national levels, no clear differences can be found as a function of age, sex, or 
education. Third, the population density of the place of residence is highly influential 
on the local population preference, and, to a lesser extent, on the national population 
preference. People living in rural areas are clearly more in favor of population growth 
and less in favor of population decline than urban dwellers. In addition, respondents 
living in provinces that have already experienced a drop in population numbers in the 
last decade oppose a further decline at the local level. It is remarkable that the role 
religion plays in people’s lives is so apparent in their population preferences. 
Proponents of population decline are generally less religious than those favoring the 
status quo or population growth. It remains unclear, however, what train of thought is 
behind this divergence among the Dutch population. The link between religiosity and 
population preference tends to be in line with studies showing that those with strong 
religious views have more conservative positions on family planning, opposing birth 
control options like contraception or abortion (for an overview, see McQuillan 2004). 
But a more concrete reason may well be the fact that, within the Dutch system of 
church financing, churches depend to a great extent on their membership numbers. 
Because the viability of many Dutch churches is in danger in small rural villages, as 
well as in aging cities, we would not expect members of church parishes to support 
population decline. 
 
Population policy preferences 
It is natural to pose the question of how population size preferences impinge on the 
population policy stance of citizens. Liberal governments have a tradition of not 
interfering in the freedom to choose with respect to number of children, and it is of 
some interest to see how this policy stance changes under the circumstances of 
population decline. Based on the assumption that collective choice is a reflection of 
individual choice and support, it seems reasonable to ask citizens whether they agree 
with certain population policy choices. In Table 5 we report findings from questions on 
whether population decline should be counteracted by either a pronatalistic policy, or 
by increasing the level of immigration. To see how the level of agreement differs across 
citizens with different population size preferences—increase, stationarity, or decline—
we have disaggregated the policy preferences by these categories. The results show that Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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the Dutch are lukewarm with respect to these policies for counteracting population 
decline. Only 13% of the respondents support pronatalistic policies, and just 5% of the 
Dutch support the option of encouraging immigration. 
 
Table 5:  Level of agreement with policy proposals to counteract population 
decline by increasing fertility and immigration 
    Population size preference  
of respondents (in percentages): 
  Total  Increase  Stationarity  Decline 
“When the population declines, the 
fertility rate should be stimulated” 
       
Disagree  44  22  37  63 
Neutral  43  37  49  31 
Agree  13  41  14  6 
Total  100  100  100  100 
“When the population declines, 
immigration should be stimulated” 
       
Disagree  60  35  55  75 
Neutral  35  48  40  21 
Agree 5  17  5  4 
Total 100  100  100  100 
 
Source: NIDI survey on population decline (2009). N = 2039 
 
Of the two policy options, the immigration policy option is clearly less popular 
than the fertility option. This bias is perhaps most clearly illustrated by looking at the 
supporters of a population increase. The pronatalistic option has more supporters than 
opponents (41% versus 22%), whereas the immigration option has more opponents than 
advocates (35% versus 17%). In short, what the supporters of growth want is 
indigenous population growth, and not imported growth.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
Population decline generally inspires fear in policymakers, and it is often associated 
with economic or cultural decline. Such an attitude may seem paradoxical if viewed 
from an historical perspective: in the 1970s and 1980s, many a population conference 
was dominated by alarmist messages about the deleterious consequences of excess van Dalen & Henkens: Who fears and who welcomes population decline? 
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population growth (cf. Schindlmayr 2004). Thus, we would expect that population 
decline would be seen as a positive development. However, steeply declining 
populations in some European countries or regions have led to (again) alarmist voices 
within the halls of government. It is unfortunate that the voices and feelings of citizens 
living in regions experiencing population decline are often neglected in reflections on 
the population debate.  
The present paper has tried to bring balance into the story of population decline by 
listening to the voices of citizens who experience it. The bottom line of this story is that 
population decline is certainly not always met with fear—it is even welcomed by some. 
The preference for population decline is most clear at the global level, but as soon as 
the phenomenon of decline moves closer to home, the preference becomes less 
pronounced and switches to the status quo. This is an important result, since it might 
suggest that, to a certain extent, population size preferences may be subject to what is 
generally known as the “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome. For example, it is a 
well-established fact that people display this syndrome regarding the construction of 
waste sites: that is, people may support a plan to build a waste site, but they do not want 
it located in their backyard. Geographic proximity is a universal factor in understanding 
NIMBY conflicts (Dear 1992). 
Establishing the extent to which attitudes toward population decline are subject to 
a true NIMBY effect is, of course, extremely difficult, because population preferences 
may be based in part on real concerns for the public interest, and not just on self-
interest. When asked about population size preferences within the Netherlands, citizens 
may realize that a population decline in their own backyards could threaten local 
welfare, and they may therefore opt for either an increasing population (11%), or 
stationarity (75%). At the national level, 31% would like the population to decline, and 
this decline is perceived as being accompanied by non-material welfare gains 
(improved environment), as well as material welfare losses (tax increases, economic 
stagnation). Apparently, respondents place a greater weight on non-material gains than 
on material losses in expressing a preference for a decline. Our study shows that 
materialistic considerations (e.g., taxes, level of public services, economic growth 
potential) are visible at the local and national levels. Non-materialistic motives are 
present at both geographic levels, although at the national level people seem to see 
more benign consequences of population decline than at the local level. At this point, 
the stated preferences of respondents are affected by their perceptions of how 
population decline may affect the quality of nature and the amount of space, and by 
their concerns about global warming. In addition to these driving forces, it appears that 
the attitude toward immigrants is a very strong determinant of preferences at the local 
and national levels: the arrival of new immigrants seems to generate greater fear than 
the prospect of population decline. The more people perceive immigration to be a Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 13 
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disruptive force in society, the less likely they are to be in favor of population growth 
(or the more likely they are to favor population decline). 
Many European regions and their governments are facing difficult policy 
dilemmas in dealing with the size and structure of their population. In the post-World 
War II era, governments could abstain from any form of policy intervention as 
populations seemed to grow steadily. Now, as the natural increase of regions falters, 
local governments fall back on strategies that are aimed at stimulating local growth, 
even if doing so harms the growth of neighboring regions. However, these policies are 
not in line with the preferences of citizens: there is only weak support for policy 
initiatives aimed at increasing the population at both the local and the national levels. 
This is particularly true for policies intended to encourage international migration. 
Furthermore, it appears that citizens have a far more nuanced assessment of population 
decline than was previously believed. Our study suggests that people are well aware of 
the potential economic disadvantages of population decline, but they can also see the 
potential non-material benefits of population reductions. Thus, local and national 
governments might learn an important lesson from their own citizens and view 
population decline in a balanced manner. 
Population change has material and non-material consequences. Because 
governments have been strongly focused on the material implications, they have been 
trying to correct the decline by means of conventional population policies, such as 
stimulating fertility. However, governments, especially at the local level, may be better 
advised to face the facts of decline instead of trying to reverse population developments 
that seem to be largely inevitable. As Reher (2007) made clear in his thought-provoking 
essay on long-run population decline, “the decades ahead for much of the world will 
lead us into mostly uncharted territory that bears few similarities with past periods of 
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Appendix: Properties of scale variables 
Table A1:  Scale characteristics, psychometric properties and  
wording of survey items 
Scale/Variable Name and Source  Items and Response Format  Scale Properties 
Local public service level 
2-item scale. A single score for this 
measure was constructed by 
calculating an unweighted mean. 
Higher scores correspond to further 
increases. 
What do you expect will be the 
consequence of population decline in your 
place of residence for: (1) number of 
shops; (2) public amenities (like schools, 
swimming pools, etc.) (1= decrease 
strongly; 2 = decrease; 3 =stay the same; 
4 = increase; 5 = increase strongly). 
α = 0.71 
National economic growth potential 
2-item scale. A single score for this 
measure was constructed by 
calculating an unweighted mean. 
Higher scores correspond to further 
increases. 
What do you expect will be the 
consequence of population decline for the 
Netherlands for: (1) economic growth; (2) 
innovation level (1= decrease strongly; 2 
= decrease; 3 =stay the same; 4 = 
increase; 5 = increase strongly). 
α = 0.61 
 
Attitude toward immigration 
3-item scale. A single score for this 
measure was constructed by 
calculating an unweighted mean. 
Higher scores correspond to higher 
support. 
What is your evaluation of the extent to 
which the Dutch government serves the 
public interest with respect to: the 
integration of immigrants? (1=very 
negative; 2 = negative; 3 =neutral; 4 = 
positive; 5 = very positive); and To what 
extent do you agree with the following 
statements? (1) The growth in the number 
of foreigners contributes to crime and 
terrorism; (2) The multicultural society is 
an asset to Dutch culture (1= completely 
disagree; 2 = disagree; 3=neither agree 
nor disagree; 4=agree; 5= completely 
agree). 
α = 0.75 
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Table A1:  (Continued) 
Scale/Variable Name and Source  Items and Response Format  Scale Properties 
Attitude toward global warming 
4-item scale. A single score for this 
measure was constructed by 
calculating an unweighted mean. 
Higher scores correspond to higher 
support 
To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements? (1) We must 
choose for the environment even though 
this may harm economic growth; (2 )I am 
very worried about global warming; (3) 
The extinction of animal species should 
be combated by all means; (4) All the 
news about global warming are highly 
exaggerated (1= completely disagree; 2 = 
disagree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 
4=agree; 5= completely agree). 
α = 0.67 
 
 
N= 2035 
 